I just discovered today that Bart Ehrman has a new blog (which may be old news, but it is new to me). If you are not familiar with Ehrman, he is a NT Prof at UNC-Chapel Hill, specialist in early Christian texts, former evangelical, outspoken critics of evangelical Christianity, and author of many bestselling books. Ehrman promises quite a few interesting things on this blog: to present his latest ideas, interact with reviewers and critics, and to continue discussions that have begun in his public debates. All that sounds great. But, here’s the catch: you have to pay to join the site. Of course, the blog makes it very clear that none of this money will go to Ehrman himself; it will all be given to philanthropy; as a “humanitarian effort” to stop poverty.
Now certainly this is to be commended. I would agree wholeheartedly with the need to stop human poverty. And I applaud Ehrman for this move. However, I must admit that there is an deep irony here that needs to be observed. It is odd to look at a webpage where the main image on the screen is flipping back and forth between (a) a call to moral responsibility in stopping poverty, and (b) an advertisement for a book that challenges the existence of God based on the problem of evil (God’s Problem). If there is no God, or at least no way to know what he is like (Ehrman claims to be an agnostic), then on what grounds to morals exist? Why should we even care about our fellow human beings? Christians have long-standing reasons for caring for humanity, one of which is that each human is made in the image of their creator. But it is the existence of this very God that all of Ehrman’s books are designed to challenge.
I raised these very same issues at the conclusion of my review of Ehrman’s book, Jesus Interrupted. They are relevant for our discussion, so I include them here:
While on the one hand Ehrman wants to insist that everyone gets to decide truth for themselves, on the other hand he turns around and makes numerous (and even dogmatic) moral claims throughout the book. Indeed, one of his primary objections against the Bible is that it does not measure up morally. He offers a moral objection to the destruction of Jericho saying it is “unworthy of God” (10). He offers moral objections to the doctrine of hell by declaring it would make God a “never-dying eternal divine Nazi” (276). He makes moral objections to Paul’s teaching on women and homosexuality saying that there are other views (presumably his own) that are morally “superior” and “better” (280). And on and on he goes. These are strong words by Ehrman–sweeping declarations about the way God (and the Bible) ought to be.
And by this point the reader begins to wonder: Where does Ehrman get these moral norms? How does he know that some doctrines of the Bible are morally superior to others? Where does he get the idea that something like hell would be morally reprehensible? How does he know what is “worthy” of God? What standard is he using? Incredibly, Ehrman makes these grand moral claims in the very book where he insists that everyone gets to decide truth for themselves and therefore should not be making grand moral claims. Which one is it? It takes a good bit of audacity to chide evangelicals for using scripture as grounds for absolute moral norms, and then to turn around and offer your own absolute moral norms smuggled in through the back door. At least Evangelicals have coherent grounds for making moral truth claims–after all, the Bible purports to be the very words of God–but what grounds does Ehrman have, as an agnostic, for making such moral truth claims? Apparently he wants us to accept these claims on his own authority.
Now I suppose Ehrman could back off at this point and say, “Oh I don’t really mean there are moral norms in the universe, I am just saying the God of the Bible personally offends me.” But, this response has its own problems: (i) If all Ehrman is saying is that he does not personally like the God of the Bible, then that has no bearing on the truth of the Bible or on whether the God of the Bible exists (or on much of anything). Things are not true or false, or right or wrong, depending on whether they happen to fit one’s personal preferences. Not liking something is not an argument. For Ehrman’s moral objection against the Bible to work there actually has to be some universal moral norm that the Bible has violated. He has to be able to show that God ought to be one way, and ought not to be another. But, the problem is that he has just spent his entire book destroying the one thing that could provide that norm–the Bible itself. (ii) If Ehrman wants to suggest all the moral claims in the book (and presumably moral claims everywhere) are just private opinion, then the end of the book becomes incoherent and contradictory when he exhorts the reader to “fight oppression” and “work for justice” and “to insist on peace” (283). If everyone creates their own moral universe, then why should the reader care about any of these things? Moreover, what is the definition of “oppression”? And how do we define “justice”? Ehrman’s concluding moral applications sound so reasonable, but his own book has just undermined any foundation for them.
Once again, I commend Ehrman’s desire to help the poor. And I hope he succeeds. But, I would suggest that he needs the Christian worldview to have a reason for doing so. Ironically, then, he must presuppose the existence of the very God he has spent his entire career arguing against.
James F. McGrath says
I’m confused by your assumption that the existence of God is coupled with objective morality, i.e. a morality that can be determined independently of persons and their unique and subjective viewpoints. I could see how this could be coupled with a view of God as impersonal and thus an objective reality. But since I take it that your view of God is closer to that found in the Bible, in which people are commanded to do things such as exterminate the population of an entire city, or sacrifice their child. To us such commands seem immoral. If you view them as moral, it is presumably your view that whatever God commands is moral, which is not objective morality – human beings have no objective way whatsoever to determine what is moral under such circumstances, but would depend entirely on divine commands.
I’ve seen “objective morality” bandied about in this way in popular debates, but I think that we academics have to hold ourselves to a higher degree of precision in the way we use language. And if God is viewed as a person who defines morality by enforcing the observance of the moral code he sets and punishing disobedience to it, it seems clear to me that that is subjective morality (even if it involves a divine subject) rather than objective morality.
Michael Kruger says
Thanks, James. Appreciate the comments. Admittedly, I am confused at your confusion. The idea that God is coupled with, and the foundation for, objective morality is not only a standard belief of historical Christianity, but also an argument regularly made by various philosophers and theologians. Indeed, this was one of the primary arguments of CS Lewis’ book, Mere Christianity. In fact, many of William Lane Craig’s public debates have argued precisely this point: that God’s existence is necessary to have objective morality. Now you might disagree with these arguments, but they are hardly new or unusual.
You raise objections to God’s call to, as you put it, “exterminate the population of an entire city.” You say “such commands seem immoral.” But on what grounds are you objecting to such extermination? What absolute moral norm are you appealing to and where does it come from? If it is just that you don’t personally like it, that is not sufficient as an argument that it is, in fact, immoral. Also, I would argue that on biblical logic there is nothing immoral about God bringing judgment on sinful people. He rained down fire on Sodom and Gomorrah for their wickedness. Do you also believe that is immoral?
You argue that even if God defines morality that it is still “subjective.” Not sure what you mean by this. If God is self-existent, immutable, transcendent, and the absolute creator of heaven and earth, then his own character is the grounds for what counts as right and wrong. Your own position seems to be arguing for no objective moral norms. I would argue that would leave you with an irrational worldview and, ironically, no basis to object to the destruction of a city you mentioned above.
James F. McGrath says
If God is immutable then God is not personal in any meaningful sense that we could use that term, and it might under those circumstances to make sense to argue that one is dealing with a morality that is objective in the normal usage of that term. But I don’t think that’s what you are trying to say here – it seems as though you are trying to bring together both the philosophical idea of God and the Biblical portrait. There is indeed a long history of doing so, but that doesn’t mean the result is coherent, much less persuasive! 🙂
But returning to the question of what morality is, why not say that morality simply is treating others the way I would want to be treated? It is fair, it is something that one can make a case for that most people could assent to and thus arguably objective? To root morality in personal moral views, even if those are the views of a personal God, is not objective morality. Indeed, as you seem to be approaching it, it is the antithesis of objective morality. While by reasoned thinking or appeal to fairness we could make the case that it is objectively wrong to exterminate every living thing in a city, on the view you seem to hold, that is not objectively wrong, since if God commands one to do it, then it is rendered right, and all appeals to the Golden Rule must be cast out the window as possible objections. Or have I misunderstood you?
Michael Kruger says
Ok, so let me get this straight. Your definition of objective morality is what “most people could assent to”? So, if most people assent to the moral belief that it is Ok to kill Jews (as Hitler’s Germany did), then that is “moral”? To allow morality to be defined by what “most people could assent to” is to destroy any possibility for transcendent moral norms. That so-called objective morality would always be in flux. It makes morality entirely contingent on the arbitrary choices of human beings. In contrast, historical Christianity has argued that moral norms are grounded in the character of God and therefore (a) do not change, and (b) are independent of the opinions of humans. In other words, something could be objectively wrong even if every single human being on the planet said otherwise.
You argue that if God is immutable he cannot be personal. However, (a) the Bible clearly teaches both these things are true of God, and (b) historically, Christians have believed both these things are true of God. All the arguments for this cannot be repeated here, but it should be noted that your view is decidedly out of sync with almost all of the history of Christian thought and Christian theology. You may have trouble reconciling these things, but most of Christian history has not.
You return again to God destroying an entire city. However, on your view you have no basis to object to this as morally wrong. On what basis do you make that claim? You still have yet to appeal to any transcendent standard for moral norms. You keep claiming that things are immoral but have yet to show why they are.
James F. McGrath says
Objective means capable of being determined by any impartial observer, accessible to anyone and not dependent on their culture, gender, or other subjective factors. My whole point is that you are not using objective in anything like its normal sense, and are perhaps using it in the opposite way. Where you got the rest of what you suggest I might have meant, I have no idea, but it was not from me.
Where in the Bible do you understand it to say that God is immutable in the philosophical sense? That many people have thought something does not make it true, or even coherent.
As a follower of Jesus persuaded that the Golden Rule is a sensible and fair moral principle, and as someone who would not want his city and all its inhabitants exterminated, I would not wish that to be done to others either.
I do not see that the idea of objective morality even makes sense, since it is not clear what morality means in the absence of persons and their subjective experience of what other persons might do to them. So perhaps we have different definitions of morality? What is yours, if I might ask?
Michael Kruger says
I think we are talking past each other. And are perhaps using terminology in different ways. I am arguing that the very idea that something is really morally “wrong”, apart from the opinions of individuals, presupposes the existence of God. Put another way, in an atheistic world, morality is incoherent. Sure, society may agree about what behavior it will follow, or not follow, but that does not make that behavior really right or wrong.
As for the immutability of God, any major Systematic Theology has extensive discussions of this with Scripture references. I am not arguing that just because people have always believed in God’s immutability therefore its true. I am simply pointing out that your belief in its incoherence is very much the minority report in the history of Christianity.
As for the passages in Scripture where God calls for the destruction of a city, I can only assume that you must think those passages are mistaken. Or that God was “wrong” to do so. I admit I am still unclear on your position there. If the Bible is a coherent document (and maybe you disagree) then God can affirm the Golden Rule and also call for the destruction of the wicked. The two are not incompatible.
James F. McGrath says
It sounds to me as though you genuinely believe that God considering something moral is what objective morality means, and indeed the only way something can be objectively moral. But what you go on to say indicates that you subscribe to a different view, divine command theory, since you say that genocide and the Golden Rule can both be moral, if and when God commands them.
Perhaps you mean that it is objectively the case that God will punish those who disobey his commands? If so, that doesn’t seem to be what it means to say that morality itself is objective.
Mike Davis says
I suppose if one charged a fee to enter their blog website they would accumulate an audience of primarily like-minded sycophants who would not disagree with their posts to the extent James obviously disagrees with yours. Also, if researchers and critics wanted to confirm that allegedly “higher degree of precision” in their use of language that James asserts, they would have to pay the fee to do so, most likely limiting the number of people doing critical review. And hey, it’s all for charity! ;^)
James F. McGrath says
Well, accumulating an entourage of like-minded sycophants is a risk all bloggers face, even those of us who don’t charge a fee to readers. Fortunately the real critical evaluation of the arguments in our scholarship takes place first and foremost in scholarly publications, and then largely on the blogs of others who disagree with us, rather than in the comments sections of our own blogs, which are not well suited to detailed argumentation and analysis.
Mike Davis says
I dunno, sometimes I think we common folk from the masses at times can make up for some of the shortcomings of peer review. Not that peer review isn’t important, but I think it can lead to an “inside the Beltway” mentality, to borrow a phrase from outside the academic world. ;^)
James F. McGrath says
While I consider input from those outside important and useful, it is not the case in my experience that most people who are not involved professionally in researching and teaching on the relevant subjects have the extensive knowledge base necessary to evaluate something like a scholarly monograph. In fact, those of us who do this for a living find it hard enough to keep up with everything just in one area we specialize in! 🙂
Derek says
Michael,
I’ve just recieved your new book on the Canon. Can’t wait to get into it!
Michael Kruger says
Thanks, Derek. Great to hear from you. Hope you enjoy the book!
Mike Davis says
I suspect you’d find a range of expertise and lack thereof among the “outsiders” who don’t have formal credentials, but whether or not you have time for their input, if they have access to your blog they can do their own analysis of your latest comments, etc. and compare it with your academic peers (or other experts)who disagree with you or with their own knowledge and research and evaluate your work. Besides, often both at your blog and in your comments in this thread the discussion is on nontechnical issues that don’t require advanced degrees to engage in (take Ehrman’s agnosticism, for example). Since you don’t charge for your website and you accept comments there you must see the point on some level. There are a number of well-known experts who don’t take comments but at least you don’t have to pay to go to their websites. And I do think it is valid to focus on the fee going to charity issue in considering whether or not that is just an attempt to deflect criticism for charging a fee to limit access.
steve hays says
James F. McGrath
“I’m confused by your assumption that the existence of God is coupled with objective morality, i.e. a morality that can be determined independently of persons and their unique and subjective viewpoints.”
i) You’re confusing the ontology of ethics with the epistemology of ethics. The first involves the grounding of ethics, the second how we know what’s ethical.
ii) You’re also committing a hasty generalization. It’s not that morality is independent of persons, per se, but creatures.
“I could see how this could be coupled with a view of God as impersonal and thus an objective reality.”
You fail to explain the alleged connection between an impersonal God and objective reality.
“But since I take it that your view of God is closer to that found in the Bible, in which people are commanded to do things such as exterminate the population of an entire city, or sacrifice their child. To us such commands seem immoral.”
To say that such commands seem immoral to you is an autobiographical statement about your mental states, not an argument for the immortality of the commands in question. Where is your argument for the immorality of such commands?
“If you view them as moral, it is presumably your view that whatever God commands is moral, which is not objective morality…”
How is that not objective morality? You keep making assertions absent supporting arguments.
“…human beings have no objective way whatsoever to determine what is moral under such circumstances, but would depend entirely on divine commands.”
That’s a false dichotomy. How are divine commands opposed to determining morality?
“I’ve seen ‘objective morality’ bandied about in this way in popular debates, but I think that we academics have to hold ourselves to a higher degree of precision in the way we use language.”
Thus far your objections are distinguished by their imprecision.
“And if God is viewed as a person who defines morality by enforcing the observance of the moral code he sets and punishing disobedience to it, it seems clear to me that that is subjective morality (even if it involves a divine subject) rather than objective morality.”
To say that “seems clear” to you is not a rational argument for your contention. When are you going to start reasoning for your position?
“If God is immutable then God is not personal in any meaningful sense that we could use that term, and it might under those circumstances to make sense to argue that one is dealing with a morality that is objective in the normal usage of that term.”
Once again, you assert a claim without giving us any reason to accept your claim.
“But returning to the question of what morality is, why not say that morality simply is treating others the way I would want to be treated?”
Like the symbiotic relationship between a sadist and a pain freak?
“It is fair, it is something that one can make a case for that most people could assent to and thus arguably objective? To root morality in personal moral views, even if those are the views of a personal God, is not objective morality.”
Your notion of fairness is rooted in your personal moral valuation.
“While by reasoned thinking or appeal to fairness we could make the case that it is objectively wrong to exterminate every living thing in a city, on the view you seem to hold, that is not objectively wrong, since if God commands one to do it, then it is rendered right, and all appeals to the Golden Rule must be cast out the window as possible objections.”
You haven’t begun to demonstrate an obligation to be “fair” or practice the Golden Rule.
“As a follower of Jesus persuaded that the Golden Rule is a sensible and fair moral principle, and as someone who would not want his city and all its inhabitants exterminated, I would not wish that to be done to others either.”
i) But you don’t believe Jesus was infallible. Do you even believe Jesus was divine? You presumably think Jesus was also a child of his times.
ii) Jesus didn’t share your view of the OT.
iii) Jesus believed in hell.
“I do not see that the idea of objective morality even makes sense.”
In which case your appeal to “fairness” as a universal norm makes no sense either.
“It sounds to me as though you genuinely believe that God considering something moral is what objective morality means, and indeed the only way something can be objectively moral. But what you go on to say indicates that you subscribe to a different view, divine command theory, since you say that genocide and the Golden Rule can both be moral, if and when God commands them.”
You’re setting up false dichotomies. It’s not just a matter of what God commands, but what God creates. He has designed us with a certain kind of nature. Our ethical obligations are related to the kind of creature he made us.
“Fortunately the real critical evaluation of the arguments in our scholarship takes place first and foremost in scholarly publications.”
Actually, that reflects academic groupthink rather than “real critical evaluation.”
James F. McGrath says
My point about an impersonal concept of God was merely that, when God is viewed as an object in that sense, it might also be possible to study God as object and determine things about morality. Whether that would be feasible in any given scenario was not my point. My point was that God is not an object that can be investigated by any person irrespective of standpoint allowing objective conclusions to be drawn about morality.
I think perhaps you are just defining “objective” as though it meant “really” and are then using it in the circular argument by defining “really moral” as “what God defines as moral” and “what God defines as moral” as “really moral.” If so, then unless you have some suggestion as to how I can join you in that circle, then we may not have anything we can usefully talk about.
Or perhaps you are saying that the act of creating beings allows the creator to define what is moral for them? If so, that would seem to imply that if humans make killing machines designed to kill a certain category of human being, that would be moral. I assume you would disagree that that is moral, but it would seem to be implicit in your claim that the very act of creation can render certain things moral.
If you would like to explain how God provides a grounds for objective morality, using “objective” in the normally accepted English usage, then please do so. It might help move the conversation forward.
steve hays says
James F. McGrath said:
“My point about an impersonal concept of God was merely that, when God is viewed as an object in that sense, it might also be possible to study God as object and determine things about morality.”
You haven’t defined what you mean by an “impersonal” concept of God, and how that relates to the objectivity (or not) of morality.
“My point was that God is not an object that can be investigated by any person irrespective of standpoint allowing objective conclusions to be drawn about morality.”
That’s another one of your assertions where there’s no connecting argument. So there’s really nothing for me to respond to.
“I think perhaps you are just defining ‘objective’ as though it meant ‘really…”
Uh, no. Objective moral norms are ethical obligations independent of what the thusly duty-bound creatures may think or feel about them.
“…and are then using it in the circular argument by defining ‘really moral’ as ‘what God defines as moral’ and ‘what God defines as moral’ as ‘really moral.’”
You continue to confuse the epistemology of ethics with the ontology of ethics. “Defining” morality would be epistemological.
You also have pat objections to Biblical morality, which requires you to shoehorn what your opponents say into your pat framework. But that’s not the argument I actually gave. Try again.
“Or perhaps you are saying that the act of creating beings allows the creator to define what is moral for them? If so, that would seem to imply that if humans make killing machines designed to kill a certain category of human being, that would be moral. I assume you would disagree that that is moral, but it would seem to be implicit in your claim that the very act of creation can render certain things moral.”
You have a problem following the argument, in part–perhaps–because you keep reducing the issue to “defining” morality.
“If you would like to explain how God provides a grounds for objective morality, using ‘objective’ in the normally accepted English usage, then please do so. It might help move the conversation forward.”
i) I don’t concede that you hold the copyright on “the normally accepted English usage” of “objective.”
ii) In addition, you seem to be treading on the word-concept fallacy.
iii) But to take a specific example, when young male lions take over a pride, they kill the cubs of the rival lion and inherit his herem.
There’s nothing morally wrong with that, because that’s the nature of lions. That’s how God made them.
The same conduct would be immoral for human males inasmuch as God gave us a different nature with different social obligations.
Kirk Blankenship says
objective: [from dictionary.com, adjectival definition] of or pertaining to something that can be known, or to something that is an object or a part of an object; existing independent of thought or an observer as part of reality.
Mr. McGrath said: “My point was that God is not an object that can be investigated by any person irrespective of standpoint allowing objective conclusions to be drawn about morality.”
According to the definition above, someone’s access to the object of study has no bearing on that thing’s “objectivity”. It might help to re-read Dr. Kruger’s and Steve Hays’ responses in light of this… uh… objective definition.
Paul Owen says
Dr. Kruger,
A comment from a fellow Edinburgh alum! I think one point that is often glossed over in the discussions of the slaughter of the Canaanites is that OT morality was accomodated to the culture of the times. Just as Jesus said that the Mosaic legislation pertaining to divorce was temporarily given because of the hardness of the hearts of Moses’ audience, so it must be the case with the order to exterminate the inhabitants of the Holy Land. After all, given that Abraham was called in order that his people might “bless” the nations, and given that Jesus ordered the Church to bless, love and pray for her enemies, it must necessarily be the case that the policy of Moses’/Joshua’s generation reflected historical realities that fell short of God’s ideal.
Michael Kruger says
Thanks, Paul. Great to hear from you! I hope all is well. Last time I heard, you were still at Montreat. Based on your email, that appears to still be the case. I appreciate your thoughts on the OT Canaanite issue. It is a difficult topic, and I know there are a lot of different possible solutions. However, I don’t understand this issue as God accomodating the morals of the times. For one, God does not merely allow the Israelites to do this (as he did in the case of divorce), but directly commands them to do this. Thus, it is hard to imagine God commanding people to sin. Yes, the promises to Abraham were that his descendants would bless the nations. But, I don’t think this precludes instances in which God can still execute his judgment on wicked people. Meredith Kline argues that the ethics practiced during this time actually reflect the ethics of the New Heavens and New Earth where all inside the people of God are spared and all outside the people of God are judged (he calls this “intrusion ethics”). But, I realize these are sticky issues and people have a variety of perspectives on it.
Paul Owen says
Yes, I’m still at Montreat. I’m considering your new book on the canon for my Christian Doctrine class by the way! As to your points, I guess we do disagree. Matthew 19:7-8 frames the divorce legislation in terms of what Moses “commands,” not just what he allows. Obviously, I get it, that given the content of the instructions, you see it as divine permission. I too see it as a kind of concession of course, but I’m not sure permission is the right word here. Furthermore, the whole Mosaic legal framework is placed within the context of God’s accomodation due to the transgressions of the people (Gal. 3:19). In that sense, the entire Old Covenant was a concession (though also God’s command).
I agree that the wickedness of the Canaanites made them fit for destruction (Gen. 15:16). And I know that God can visit the iniquity of the fathers on their children (Ex. 34:7). But I also know that God takes no delight in the death of the wicked (Jon. 4:2; Ezek. 18:23). And I know that God wants little children to come to him and not be hindered from entering his kingdom (Matt. 19:14). Therefore I do not see the radical punishment of the Canaanites at the hands of the very people who were raised up to be a vehicle of their salvation (“a light to the nations”) as an expression of God’s ideal. It was decreed by God, but not desired by God, and to me it is another sign of the inferiority of the Old Covenant and its replacement with the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount. I just think we have to be careful not to sound tone deaf when we speak about the actual slaughtering of infants and even animals who have committed no sins of their own (Jon. 4:11!).
Michael Kruger says
Thanks, Paul. Appreciate those thoughts. I don’t think our views are that far apart (though there are some differences). I agree that there are differences between the Old covenant and New covenant, though I am not sure that ethics is the main differential (I am speaking in regard to God’s moral law, not civil or ceremonial). In terms of sounding “tone deaf”, I agree that we don’t want to appear to be indifferent or callous to the death of these people. However, I would argue there are no “innocent” people in a post-fall world. Take, for instance, Noah’s flood. That wiped out men, women, children, and animals. And yet it was a direct act of God himself. In one sense, the flood is very sad. In another sense, the flood is a righteous act of God. Thus, if God executed a similar judgment on the Canaanites, and used the armies of Israel as his instrument, I don’t see a reason why that should be deemed a concession. Rather I take it as another instance where God judges wicked peoples as he sees fit (and in other instances, as he sees fit, he shows mercy).
Paul Owen says
Interesting point about the flood story. I can see how you might connect those in your model. And of course, I do not deny that God’s moral law remains constant. I would see the military policies of Israel as part of what we now call God’s “civil” Law (which of course still has a moral dimension to it). Interesting topic in any event!
Michael Kruger says
Thanks, Paul. And good point about Israel’s policies having at least some connection to the civil law of Israel. Hope to hear from you again! If you are ever in Charlotte, be sure to stop by and say hello.
James F. McGrath says
Right, thanks, that was exactly my point. If God can command slaughter of enemies on some occasions and love of enemies on others, then there is no way that that can be known independent of thought or observer as part of reality. And God’s own personhood, if one views God as personal, also complicates the claim that God is the ground of an “objective morality.” Thank you so much for providing that definition – I think it will help people understand my point who may not have previously.
Kirk Blankenship says
Your response is baffling. If morality that is rooted in the character of God exists “independent of thought or an observer as part of reality”, how does that prove your point?
You also appear as if you continue to confuse the existence of ethics and how we know ethics. Since I am merely an armchair philosopher, I admit that I may be confused, but it appears that most of Steve Hays’ objections still stand unaddressed.
James F. McGrath says
Again, I am not sure that we are on the same page. Are you saying that you do not view God as one who thinks and observes? It seems to me that you are rooting morality in the divine subject, which is fine, but are then calling that “objective.” My question is, if that is you view, why call what you are referring to objective morality? I don’t see how that label is appropriate.
Kirk Blankenship says
Yes, I do believe that God is one who thinks and observes. He can and does know his creation in a personal and subjective way(albeit transcendently so). And Yes, morality is rooted in the divine subject, but from the human or creaturely perspective is he not the divine object? A scripture quote that I feel illustrates the existence of God as a divine object is Romans 1:20 “For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made, so that [men] are without excuse.”
Let me try to illustrate and you tell me if my illustration is valid. Imagine you are told that there is an object, namely a treasure map, behind a door that is locked from the inside and as reality would have it, there is, in fact, a treasure map. Although you have no access to the treasure map, it nonetheless exists irrespective of your lack of access. It is an object that retains the possibilities of being known, and were you to attain it, it would in fact lead you to a treasure. Alas, you have no key and therefore the possession of the map is denied. Nevertheless, the map and the realities to which it points objectively exist. Does this help or simply muddy the waters more?
James F. McGrath says
But this treasure does not exist somewhere other than in the mind of the Creator, whom you have said you consider a subject, a personal entity. And so I get what you a saying, and my point is not whether this view of morality should be embraced or rejected, but what it should be called. I don’t see what leads you to call it “objective.”
It seems to me that without there being multiple persons, whom one can treat as one would want to be treated or not, there is no such thing as morality. Morality seems to me to be inherently personal and interpersonal, and the teaching of Jesus seems to me to reflect that. And so I am not sure, from a Christian perspective, what drives the desire to use the terminology of “objective morality” anyway.